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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 15-3242 
_____________ 
 
DALE SHAFFER, 
                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH; NICHOLAS J. BOBBS, in his official and individual 
capacities; 
ANTONIO CIUMMO, in his official and individual capacities; JOHN and/or 
JANE DOE, 
in their official and individual capacities  
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania                                                          
District Court No. 2-14-cv-01674 
District Judge: The Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 17, 2016 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 25, 2016)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 This case comes to us on appeal from the District Court’s grant of 
Appellees’1 motion to dismiss Appellant’s suit alleging malicious prosecution, 
false arrest, false imprisonment, conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and  
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress under Pennsylvania law.  The District Court agreed with the magistrate 
judge’s report and recommendation and held that Appellant failed to allege 
sufficient facts to infer that probable cause to arrest did not exist, and thus all of his 
claims should be dismissed.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.   
I. 
 On March 13, 2013, a PNC Bank branch in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was 
robbed by an adult, Caucasian male wearing dark sunglasses.  A female teller had 
direct contact with the robber, while two male employees had indirect observations 
of the robber.  On March 14, the police department released a still photograph of 
the bank robber, and on that same day received a phone call from Appellant’s 
mother claiming that Appellant was the robber.  On March 15, the police placed 
Appellant’s photograph in four different photo arrays and showed it to the three 
                                                 
1 Appellees are the City of Pittsburgh, police officers Nicholas J. Bobbs and Antonio 
Ciummo, and John and/or Jane Does, two unknown supervisors in the City of Pittsburgh 
Police Department.  The individual defendants have been sued in their individual and 
official capacities. 
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bank employees.  The female employee was unable to identify anyone, whereas 
both male employees quickly identified Appellant as the robber.  On March 26, the 
police officers showed Appellant’s parole officer a still photograph from the 
robbery and asked whether the person identified in the photograph was the 
Appellant.  The parole officer identified Appellant as the bank robber.   
 The next day, on March 27, the police officers applied for an arrest warrant.  
The affidavit of probable cause stated that on March 14 the police received a phone 
call from a person who provided the name of Appellant as the man who robbed the 
PNC Bank.  The affidavit also gave a summary of each bank employee’s 
description of the robbery using the name of the Appellant as the robber.  Finally, 
it stated that Appellant “was put into a photo array and positively identified on 
March 15, 2013, as the male that robbed the bank.”  JA 62.  The affidavit did not 
say that the phone call came from Appellant’s mother and it did not include the 
parole officer’s identification of Appellant.  Appellant was arrested on the same 
day and charged with two counts of robbery.  After a two-day trial, a jury found 
him not guilty on February 4, 2014.     
 Appellant filed suit.  The District Court agreed with the magistrate judge’s 
report and recommendation that Appellant’s complaint contained insufficient 
factual allegations to plausibly infer that probable cause was lacking for 
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Appellant’s arrest, and therefore granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss all claims.  
Appellant’s timely appeal followed.2 
II.   
  Appellant argues that the affidavit upon which the arrest warrant was based 
contained four material omissions that, if known to the magistrate judge who 
approved the arrest warrant, would have negated probable cause in this case.  The 
four omissions alleged are: (1) that the female teller initially described the robber 
as having braces, which Appellant does not have; (2) that the female teller was 
unable to identify Appellant in the photo array; (3) that both  male employees, who 
did identify Appellant in the photo array, only saw the robber for a few seconds 
and did not have direct contact with him; and (4) that the robber wore large 
sunglasses during the commission of the crime, which, combined with his long 
hair, made identification “extremely difficult.”   
 The lack of probable cause is an element of each of Appellant’s claims for 
relief.  Thus, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, Appellant must adequately 
allege “(1) that the police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood 
in applying for a warrant;’ and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are material, 
                                                 
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’”  Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 
786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
1997)).  Even assuming Appellees had the requisite state of mind, the omissions 
alleged are not “material,” because if they were included in the affidavit, probable 
cause to arrest would still have existed. 
 In determining whether an omission is material, we reconstruct the affidavit 
and “insert the facts recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the 
‘corrected’ warrant affidavit would establish probable cause.”  Id. at 789; Reedy v. 
Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Probable cause exists if there is a 
‘fair probability’ that the person [has] committed the crime at issue.”  Wilson, 212 
F.3d at 789.  While “a positive identification by a victim witness, without more, 
would usually be sufficient to establish probable cause . . . . [i]ndependent 
exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of the witness’s own unreliability that 
is known by the arresting officers could outweigh the identification such that 
probable cause would not exist.”  Id. at 790.3   
                                                 
3 The magistrate judge and District Court failed to apply our test for materiality as laid 
out in Wilson and reaffirmed in Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2010), instead 
concluding that the potentially exculpatory evidence was not “fundamental” evidence that 
would completely exonerate the suspect.  A quick read of Wilson, which similarly 
involved one witness being unable to identify the defendant in a photo array, would 
reveal that this was “the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.”  Wilson v. Russo, 
212 F.3d 781,788 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 
(8th Cir. 1993)).  Thus, as in Wilson, the next step should have been a reconstruction of 
the affidavit.  Id. at 789. 
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 In Wilson, the Court was confronted with a similar situation: a photo array 
was shown to two witnesses, one of whom immediately selected the defendant as 
the perpetrator of the crime, while the other could not say with certainty that he 
recognized any of them.  Id. at 785.  The affidavit omitted: (1) a discrepancy 
between the investigating officer’s conclusion that the robber was between 6’3” 
and 6’5” and the defendant’s height of 5’11”; (2) the failure of one witness to pick 
the defendant out of the array; and (3) the fact that another witness saw the 
defendant at a different location when the defendant was purportedly at the scene 
of the crime.  Id. at 788, 791.  The Court “weigh[ed] the inculpatory evidence 
against any exculpatory evidence available to the officer” and then concluded that 
the exculpatory facts were “not strong enough to undermine a finding of probable 
cause.”  Id. at 791-92.  Thus, this was within a class of cases where “a positive 
identification was not fatally undermined by unreliability or exculpatory 
evidence.”  Id. at 790.   
 Here, we have not one, but two positive identifications.  The affidavit also 
noted the phone call in which the caller identified Appellant as the robber.4  As in 
                                                 
4 The affidavit failed to mention that the phone call came from Appellant’s mother or that 
Appellant’s parole officer also identified Appellant from a still photograph of the bank 
robbery.  Appellant does not contest the magistrate judge and District Court’s reliance on 
these identifications in this civil suit and only attacks their credibility.  However, our 
review is limited to what was contained in the affidavit for probable cause that was 
submitted to a neutral magistrate in the criminal proceeding.  United States v. Hodge, 246 
F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2001).  Any inculpatory evidence that was not mentioned in the 
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Wilson, another witness, the female teller, was unable to provide an identification.  
She did not affirmatively identify someone else as the robber.  See id. at 790 
(noting that the case could turn out differently in such a scenario).  When 
considering this omission in tandem with the other omissions alleged – the female 
teller initially describing the robber as having braces, the male employees only 
having a brief look at the robber, and the robber’s face being obstructed by large 
sunglasses and long hair – their inclusion would not have altered the outcome of 
the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination.  These omissions may have 
been useful as impeachment evidence at trial to challenge the accuracy of the 
identifications, but they do not negate probable cause given the circumstances here, 
which requires only a “fair probability” that a suspect has committed a crime.  Id. 
at 789.   
 Accordingly, because Appellant failed to allege facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that probable cause was lacking, and because the lack of probable 
                                                                                                                                                             
affidavit “was evidently not a part of [the police officers’] probable cause determination.”  
Reedy, 615 F.3d at 221.  Instead, when the arrest is done pursuant to a warrant, the 
probable cause determination must “be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.”  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).   
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cause is an element of all six counts,5 we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
Appellees’ motion to dismiss. 
 
                                                 
5 Because we will affirm the District Court’s decision that Appellant failed to allege facts 
sufficient to infer that probable cause did not exist, we need not address the other 
arguments raised by the parties.   
